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'f have a disease: f see language-Hearing deviates to scopia..
Roland Barthes
It was Roland Barthes who, after Sartre, reminded the French students
of my generation that 'power was present in the most delicate
mechanisms of social exchange: not only in the State, in classes, in
groups, but even in fashion, public opinion, entertainment, news,
sport, family and private relations'. Indeed his Mythologies (1957)
became such a seminal reference that from the early 1970s onwards,
an obligatory component of the modem Humanities was to learn how
to detect the presence of power in language which was (in Barthes'
words again) 'the object in which it is inscribed for all of human
eternity' .1 Two generations separate the Protean career of this mentor
of my youth from the inquisitorial puritanism of his more recent
epigones in the Anglo-Saxon world. And in this lapse of time, his
legacy of Sapientia, ('no power, a little knowledge, a little wisdom,
and as much flavour as possible'), seems to have been reduced to a
standardised urge to identify the stratagems of power in discourse or
the perpetrators of politically incorrect thoughts. Of course Barthes
never was merely a decoder of signs or a stern prosecutor of La
pensee bourgeoise. He was a shrewd interpreter of images and a
somewhat fetishistic lover of literarite; and if, as a critic, he excelled
in tracing the hidden truths of power and desire, it is mostly as an
inventor of theoretical fictions, or as a subverter of systematic theory,
that he proved himself to be most original. It is strange to see his
conceptual libertinage, or even the more technical essays of his
Brechtian phase, being used as evidence in the trial of literate culture
that is presently conducted in the name of Communication.
But it is not to muse on the oddity of his posthumous situation that
I open this essay with a reference to Roland Barthes. The reason for
recalling his semiological redefinition of power as an ideological
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(and not simply political) object is the relation it bears to the current
redefinition of 'reading' and the so-called visual literacies. It is not
simply that Barthes' semioclastic enterprise has become a grim fixation
on the hidden truth of all texts as power, but that the structural
complement of this concern with the invisibility or, more exactly, the
opacity of power, is the utopia of a possible transparency in language
and society. It is this dream of immediate visibility which, to my
mind, spurs the current redefinition of literacy. It is argued, for
example, that words should be identified visually as graphic signifiers
rather than 'sounded' by those who learn how to read.2 Yet evidence
in the field suggests that learners do not benefit from this redefinition
of the written word as an almost exclusively visual sign. And even
though a tentative return to the old methods is currently taking place,
I am told that children raised with television find it harder to distinguish
the vowels of new words, or extract themselves from the omnipresent
aural and visual hubbub of their domestic circumstances.
It is also contended that by never making their rhetorical premises
clear, English teachers, albeit unconsciously, may have served the
interest of a class that always sought to establish the principle of its
social privileges as a kind of innate cultural superiority. But such
proclivities to naturalise culture or desocialise education have been
criticised to the point where, to be 'literate' now implies an ability to
read, past the explicitly signified utterance of a text, its connoted
subtext, or the scriptor's position in the socio-cultural hierarchy.
What seems to have been forgotten is that if language at once defines
and signifies a relationship between parties engaged in the process of
communication, it also coincides with intentions. Inasmuch as our
questions tend to presuppose their answers and our theories to
reproduce their premises: if we listen to language, language speaks
through the subject; if we listen to a person in order to learn a foreign
language, we are more interested in the unfamiliar syntactic
constructions or the unforeseen usages of terms we thought we
understood. But when we listen to a person personally, we no longer
perceive the organisation of his speech or the paradigms to which his
words belongs. Then, it is the subject who speaks, and not language.
Literary works, whatever their genre, respond unfavourably to
intellectual attack. And though it is not the place to argue that readers
ought to frame apart the object of their attention or show the detached
interest so magnificently criticised by Pierre Bourdieu, I would still
like to contend that an anti-romantic prejudice can impair the practice
of reading by systematically opposing the essence of a work to the
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material conditions of its production. The suggestion, for instance, .
that'a sense of wonder' might have oriented the writing of novel or a
poet's work would probably be dismissed as a nonsense in educated
(Le., 'literate') circles, or brushed aside with the argument that only a
detailed study of the writer's belonging to a sociological field, would
reveal the principle of hislher curiosity. Equitable as it may sound,
this assumption negates the transcendental possibility, or the self-
transforming power of the work of art on an a priori basis and is
therefore not value-free. Similarly, the thesis that social inequity can
be found registered in the fabric of a culture's highest achievements
is by no means less prejudiced than the view according to which
great works, be they philosophical, artistic or literary, are by definition
apolitical, or more optimistically still, on the side of the oppressed. It
is of course true that the notion of a conspiracy against 'the people' at
work in the literary canon coincides not only with Barthes' conception
of language as fascist, but also with the properties of a medium by
means of which it once was possible to control the collective memory
of a social grouping.3 And it is evident that the cold protocol of the
written phrase, or the detachment of speech from its context of
production, also contribute to current misgivings about classical
notions of literary excellence. Yet to become genuinely critical, such
notions would have to be conterpointed with the realisation that from
the Renaissance onwards, literate culture has been both an expreSSion
of social privilege and the medium through which the legitimacy of
social privilege could be effectively attacked. In most cases, however,
that point seems to be deliberately ignored or suppressed!
One reason for this partiality is the degree to which the anxious
fascination with 'reading/writing' as an aspect of the power/knowledge
equation, and its perceived solution, the so-called visual literacies,
agrees with the logic of a society dominated by the categories of
seeing. With its double promise of emancipation from a despotic
linguistic order and effortless intellectual gains, such a response to
the reality of illiteracy as the one offered by the apostles of
Communication seem ideal. In reality, it is as destructive as it is
illusory! Technological 'hype' and the enthusiasm for our Brave
New World that emanates from the Media-Study departments should
not make us forget how disastrous the abandonment of deliberate
slowness in the act of reading/thinking has been to contemporary
culture. For at the same time as fast writing and reading define not
just journalistic criticism, but every sphere of activity dominated by
the technocracy of Communication, serious artists and thinkers are de
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facto excluded from the public debate, and we can see for ourselves
that to the profusion of academic niches in which 'writing' is taught
(and literature banned) corresponds the near-total absence of serious
public and literate publications.
This redefinition of the public intellectual life by a principle of
visual immediacy also implies a system that organises its own
opposition and locates it de preference in the arts or certain quarters
of Academia. Elsewhere, our humanitas barely extends beyond the
register of the video clip, the publicity message or the headline of the
printed media To the intolerance of the slightest syntactical complexity
shown by the Press industry corresponds the presumed impatience of
its consumer (reader) whose formative references are primarily visual.
The reading habits of the latter implies a visual apprehension of
words that are literally flashed to the mind as so many neon signs or
ready-made slogans. But they forbid the retour sur soi of reflexivity
or the withdrawal from appearances associated by Hannah Arendt
with the thinking activity itself. Because they are to be grasped at a
glance, the sentences printed in our newspapers can hardly hope to
signify any nuance, paradox or uncertainty. It is sometimes argued
that the crisp, punchy and above all direct style preferred by
professional journalists is intended to let the facts speak for themselves
and demonstrate an ability to bear witness without the hindrance of
an intellectual involvement. But the anti-discursive mode of the Press
mostly intimates that its referent is no longer a cosa mentale but a
cosa visuale meant to be viewed in passing, then lost from sight as
one turns the page and forgotten the next instant Produced (literally)
by the form (Le., format) of the mass-media, an inattentive attention
has come to define a way of seeing/understanding that is both fluid
and passive, and whose object cannot be retained by the memory.
The prevalent expectation to get to the point straight away and see
what signs stand for without the detour of interpretation also signifies
an end to the ambition of seeing past the tautological evidence of
things as things or of experiencing over a period of time their meta-
morphosis into ideas. In other words, the object of communication is
processed in such a way that it is deemed valid in one respect only.
Having more or less transmuted the whole process of
communication into a visual happening, our society cannot but assume
a certain transparency of the individual as a moral agent. Discretion
becomes not simply an outmoded virtue but a sign of civic impropriety,
and few people still doubt the intrinsic badness of privacy. This ideal
candour infects not just public life, but the private realm as well. And
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saturated with the knowledge that 'power is present in the most
delicate mechanisms of social exchange: not only in the State, in
classes, in groups, but even in family and private relations', most of
us now appear anxious to believe that only 'power' is the enemy.
Thus in a world where the ideal of 'freedom' clashes with the demand
for 'equality' and no longer evokes a politically acceptable utopia,
the meaning of 'responsibility' or 'authority' becomes restricted to a
notion of potential guilt. And this is precisely how the verb 'to
understand' evolved to denote a willingness to demonstrate a lucidity
that is essentially a readiness to point an accusatory finger towards
something or someone with the intimation that it, he or they bear a
responsibility in the workings of a bad order of things. The target of
such an understanding can be a person or a group defined by
parameters such as age, race, gender, religion or whatever standard
behaviour believed to define them as SUCh. It can be a conception of
happiness, a way of life, or more abstract ideas like 'the West',
'Patriarchy', 'Democracy' or 'Beauty'. But always the essence of the
activity remains the immediate identification of a guilty party by
visual means or the instantaneous deciphering of coded iconic
messages.
Again, the immediate decoding of their constituent signs has
very little to do with the slow, complex and, above all, patient
translation of the marks left by a creative agency formerly known
as 'reading'. The activity now going under that name has become a
kind of scanning process, a Pavlovian response to the non-equivocal
intimations of signs which instead of 'referring to the Object which
they denotes by virtue of being really affected by that object ... refer
to the Object which they denote by virtue of characters of their
own' (c. S. Pierce). In other words, if it is possible to deduce the
existence of a fire from a column of smoke, or, if footprints in the
sand told Robinson Crusoe that another man lived on his island,
no such indications are given in the semantic object which functions
as an arbitrarily indicative device. As a sign, it does not resemble
anything or evoke anything in the mind of those who look at it
without prior knowledge of what they are supposed to see. Insisting
on the dumb factualness of the denoted object, 'it' implies that 'it'
is nothing other than what its tag or label says. There can be no
ambiguity, no divergent interpretation or symbolic meaning, let alone
Barthesian third message, indeed the whole operation consists in
identifying a ready-made thought designated by a coded image. And
to illustrate this type of understanding with an example borrowed
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from my habitual field, let me briefly sketch how the notion that
painting can be read as a coded iconic sign is inculcated.
In the twilight of their half-sleep during classes of art historyl
theory, art students are often presented with a great many slides and a
pinch of knowledge to go with them. It is expected that they will then
be able to identify works, by the name of their authors fITst, then by
their title, and then depending on the culture of their teachers, by
their place in an (Euvre, the circumstances of their original creation,
their relationship with other works, contemporary or not. In effect,
the meaning of each work is taught as a conventional affair for the
most part and the consequence of an identification process that is a
matter of cultural competence (Le. literacy) primarily. At no time is
aesthetic judgement expected to playa part in the process. There can
be no imaginative connection, no 'analogical' link between the painting
defined as a coded iconic sign and what it refers to. Understood in
that way, works of art come to signify no more than the name of their
author, an instance of a historical style or a typical case of Patriarchal
dominance or Eurocentric ideology. Thus an essential dimension of
art is lost, and more particularly the signifying possibility of what
Immanuel Kant called the Aesthetic Idea.
By aesthetic idea I mean that representation of the imagination which
induces much thought, yet without the possibility of any definite
thought whatever (i.e. concept) being adequate to it, and which
language, consequently can never quite get on level terms with or render
completely intelligible. 4
What typifies the aesthetic idea is that it makes one think a lot in the
absence of concepts, and therefore allows the possibility of multiple
associations which corresponds (in Kant's words again) to 'the rapid
and transient play of the imagination'. If, as a structure of aesthetic
signs, a work of art cannot, properly speaking, signify ideas, it is
simply because it embodies them, or because it is in itself an
idea. Inseparable, the expression and the content of a work of art
must be experienced simultaneously: meaning cannot be severed from
the physical presence which conveys it and our co-presence to it By
contrast, the iconic 'reading' of a work of art can only be described as
a participation in a semiotic ritual during which it is only possible to
declare 'yes, I see ... '. But all that one sees then is a frozen image or
the sign of a conventional denomination. Numerous artistic statements
can best be understood as answers to the question 'do you see what
I see?' rather than'do you see what I mean?'. And the consequence of
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this fixation on the object's immediate appearance as an artistic
sign is the waning of its expressive power, an end to the possibility
(grammatical or aesthetic) of thinking past the evidence of what we
see here and now, or to articulate the as-yet-unclear thoughts whose
origin lies in the actually-lived encounter with some form of Beauty.
Reading was the apprenticeship by means of which individuals
traditionally learned how to detach themselves from the perpetual
recurrence characteristic of what Hannah Arendt termed Vita Activa:
'the way of life chiefly devoted to keeping oneself alive'.5 And
reading, before writing, was that initial step in the constitution of that
particular 'self to which the specific 'intelligence' of art corresponds.
However, even amongst students of the humanities, reading, it would
seem, is less readily tolerated, or at any rate less willingly practised
than writing. The latter remains an unavoidable necessity: One needs
'to know writing' or 'to do writing' in order to use a computer or to sit
for one's exams. Writing is deemed productive, but not reading, unless
it is redeemed by writing. So one reads as little as possible whilst
gorging oneselfon a visual diet of the most indifferent quality. Besides,
reading takes time, and no-one has any of that precious commodity to
spare. The widespread habit of reading whilst doing something else,
like falling asleep, travelling or listening to music, is but an expreSSion
of this universally perceived shortage of time. As a consequence,
fewer are those who manage to read with the fully attentive presence to
themselves required for any intelligent translation of the words on the
page and their coming to life in the story that one tells oneself as one
reads. To quote one of my countrymen whose name I have forgotten,
though it could be Montaigne: 'lire, c'est se lire'.6
Mindful not to endorse the repulsive Ivory Tower theory according
to which the world where one reads is an oasis (a beach, a bed or a
philosopher's chamber), we must acknOWledge that (slow) reading
does not agree with an economic system whose every product must
be purchased, consumed and then immediately forgotten. For it is not
enough to say that the necessity of slowness which defines reading as
a interpretative process is negated by the very pace of our world. To
meditate on an image or to reflect on a cluster of poetic sentences,
and all that 'ruminating' aspects of the literate activity, breach the
productive imperative which is for the most part an obligation of
conspicuous hyper-activity. Thus 'reading' in the old sense of the
word, also perceived as an anti-social form of leisure, has become a
suspect activity. Quoting by contrast, with its tacit reference to
authority, is much more positively regarded. Whilst the practice of
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quotation requires constant attention to the context of reception, the
activity of a reader depends on a capacity for self-oblivion and
detachment from immediate circumstances that is completely at odds
with the spectacular conformism of our times. Silent, out of reach,
disconnected, invisible: no-one can tell what thoughts are entering
his mind. Hence the urgency to identify the potential dissidents that
(slow) readers are and promote 'writing' as an alternative. Moreover
if it is relatively easy to control what people read, it is much more
difficult to control how they read. And it is generally with the
expectation that he will make good use of them, that a child or a
student is given 'good', that is to say useful or edifying, books to
read. Another commonplace is that the pleasures of reading are
indissociable from the joys of learning: we learn to read and we read
to learn. Less socially acceptable is the proposition that one also
reads to read, and reads to delearn. But only such a disinterested
interest will give readers the freedom to suspend moral judgement
and benefit from what Milan Kundera describes as the paradoxical
wisdom of the novel.
Suspending moral judgement is not the immorality of the novel, it is its
morality. The morality that stands against the ineradicable human habit
of judging instantly, ceaselessly, and everyone; of judging before and
in the absence of understanding. 7
Perhaps the most banal and widespread idea apropos reading is that it
fosters self-enrichment or the acquisition of a specific (and generally
practical) knowledge. In other words, it is justified as an activity
which increases our capital of references: to know more, one assumes,
is to be more. Only 'reading' as a possibility means infinitely more
than intellectual accumulation. For it is while reading that the citizens
of a once-literate-world used to form, reform and finally formulate
themselves. This is less likely to happen when the communication
tools supposed to facilitate every mental operation, in fact create the
massive non-response state, the aphasia or the aggressive imbecility
that prostrate the Spirit. But this imaginative impotence has become
banal and is no longer perceived as a problem. Increasingly the
relevance of a cultural product boils down to its entertaining power,
or more exactly 'to its ability to take possession' (almost in the
sexual sense) of its targeted audience. The electronic media require
no participation on the part of their viewers, only the happy
acquiescence, the distracted attention secured by the iconic packaging
of their message.
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The consequences of the trend towards new literacies in the visual
arts are just as serious as they are in the literary domain. For only in
reading, understood in its deepest hermeneutic sense, lies the possibility
of a connection between the self and the not-self, the particular and
the general or the private and the public without which art, in the
Modernist acceptance of the term, ceases to be a possibility. Notions
such as 'the naked eye', 'back to the old Masters', or the dichotomy
between art as idea and art as expression, basically reflect the
intolerance for complexity that typifies a culture having bowed out to
the mass-media. Harold Rosenberg once suggested that of all the
reasons that tend to make artists suspicious of theory, the most widely
shared was that 'the function of ideas consists in placing art at the
mercy of non-artists'.8 But indirectly, I think, his suggestion also was
that the intellectual powerlessness of artists causes them to find
themselves in the situation of being told what to think and become
illustrators of received ideas. I am not convinced that the alternative
to this ancillary state is the refusal of all theory epitomised by Jackson
Pollock loosing himself in the 'ritual' of his painting or the rejection
of all aesthetic references in post-Duchampian art.
If we harked back to the times when art emancipated itself from
the Church, the State and the various aristocracies of money, we
would find as a primary source the desire of being as complete or as
unspecialised as possible. Artists, in the critical sense of the word,
cannot be described as 'creative' specialists, or specialised workers
who know how to apply the best skills to make the most splendorous
objects. Their work no longer aims at the production of fine objects,
but vies to realise 'happiness' in the practice of art. Consequently to
'read' a work of art is to discover how its maker responded to the
force of his circumstances, that is with what inventiveness, courage
or lack of it; it means to learn how such or such a decision was taken
and then sustained in the work; and it means also to experience how
exposed the work itself remains to the summons of our own
circumstances. That is precisely what Ortega Y Gasset suggested
when he proposed to call the Classics before 'a court of shipwrecked
men to answer certain peremptory questions with reference to real
life',9 Aristotle, Nietzsche or more recently, Hannah Arendt likewise
believed that the primordial question answered by works of art is that
of eudaimonia, bona vita or the 'good life'.
From this perspective, I cannot but associate the Modernist striving
for control over the means of artistic production with Courbet's
ambition of being 'a worker' in the full sense of the word, so
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presciently acknowledged by Marx when he described the artist as
the last worker, that is, as the last free worker. For if we cared to
remember the battles fought in the name of a libertarian Socialism in
the second half of the past century-episodes to which so many
artists and artisans associated themselves-we would recall a battle
fought in the name of human dignity at work and understand better
the vital connection of all the arts with eudaimonia. Unfortunately,
the recollection of such moments in history tends to make one feel a
little gloomy as one realises that a very large number of people come
to the visual arts precisely in the hope of transcending their linguistic
and social powerlessness. Often, in the process of interviewing
candidates for admission at the school where I teach, it is painfully
obvious that their most immediate need is not art, but functional
literacy or, more plainly still, grammar. Without it. studio practice is
most likely to capsize into the indulgent routine of those who simply
ignores the cultural tradition to which art belongs since image makers
successfully emancipated themselves from their conditions of civil
servants or domestic employees.
At the most simple level, the collapse of the Modernist project-
one of cultural and political emancipation~oincides with a loss of
functional literacy amongst the young and their increased vulnerability
to economic exploitation. The imposition of Competency Based
Training in TAPE art schools (or the transformation of university art
schools into colleges of graphic design and computer technology)
corresponds both to this situation and to the cultural amnesia
which causes the ideal of the worker as a complete individual to be
once again forsaken. The dismemberment of the latter into so many
specialised areas of professional expertise suggests why illiterate
artists are no longer considered unqualified to produce significant art.
But when artists are forced back in the situation of painting cultural
emblems, or providing decorative signs of intellectuality, they can
only find an iconic definition for their name: a signature style, a sign
to be 'read' at a glance, and without the shadow of a thought.
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